T HE monetary and financial events which attended the military operations carried on by Great Britain and her continental allies against the armies of France, between 1793 and 1815, have acquired at this time a special interest. The wars of the Napoleonic era present, in their political and economic aspects, numerous points of similarity to, as well as interesting points of contrast with, the great war of the past five years. An examination of some of the financial experiences of England during and immediately following this earlier period may be useful, not only in setting forth historical parallels and contrasts, but in furnishing valuable lessons for our own time.
It is proposed to consider in this paper, certain aspects of the financial history of England for a period beginning just before the war and extending to the year 1830, thus including the interval of recovery and return to normal conditions. The object of this study is primarily to bring together statistical data concerning currency, prices, the rate of interest, etc., which are available without elaborate research and special calculation. It is not intended to enter at any length into a causal inquiry or reasoned interpretation of the events disclosed, but rather to present the materials in clear and usable form, enabling comparison to be made between the various sets of data and laying a basis for further investigation.
COMMODITY PRICES
Statistics of price movements form a natural starting point for an inquiry of this sort. For the well-known index numbers of W. Stanley Jevons, for the years from 1782 until 1865, we are primarily indebted to Mr. Thomas Tooke, an English merchant in the Russian trade whose career extended through and beyond the war period. Tooke, an earnest student of currency and prices, published in 1823 a work entitled Thoughts and
Details on the High and Low Prices of the Last Thirty
Years, later expanded into the first two volumes of his more widely familiar History of Prices. In his Thoughts and Details Tooke included a table, extending from 1782 to 1822, of the prices of seventy-eight raw materials and foodstuffs (including different varieties) which were furnished by a friend, Mr. A. Hinrichs. The principal source was Prince's Price Current established in 1782, the leading publication of its kind in that day. Only about forty of these quotations were later copied and 1 Vol. 2, Appendix, 1838. 2 Reprinted in his Investigations in Currency and Finance, 1884, pp. 119 f. In the reference above to the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society I have used the present name of the publication. Previous to 1887 it was called the Statistical Journal. [282] brought down to 1837 i n the History of Prices,1 with the assistance of Mr. M. L. Merac, who likewise derived practically all of his figures from the Price Current. The table of prices as given in this volume includes the high and low quotations at four periods within each year:
(1) about the middle of January, (2) the last days of March and first days of April, (3) about the middle of July, and (4) about the middle of November. There are many gaps in the data, especially in the quotations for the first and last periods during the earlier years. This series was continued in the subsequent volumes of the History of Prices. In the early sixties, Professor Jevons conceived the plan of casting these materials into the form of an index number, in order that the general trend of prices might be ascertained. His results first appeared in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society for June, 1865.
2 Jevons utilized practically all of Tooke's quotations, as given in the History of Prices, and supplemented these by a very few others from different sources. No attempt was made to average the four sets of quotations for each article each year, and Jevons used merely those for the second quarter, for which the figures were on the whole most complete. This fact is of importance in the proper use and understanding of his results. Taking the prices of 1782 as a base, Jevons constructed a series of index numbers, using the geometric mean of the individual ratios to obtain the final indices. No weights were given to the various commodities except by the inclusion in some instances of several varieties of the same article, as in the case of cotton, coffee, and sugar. Jevons also obtained index numbers for various groups of commodities such as " corn " (six cereals), metals, fibres, oriental and tropical produce. The commodities entering into his general index number, and the composition of the special groups for the limited period 1782-1830 are enumerated in Table 1 . An examination of this list 1793, 1798, 1801, 1803, 1806, and 1808. base year, 1782; and for eight commodities, later than 1790, the year from which I shall hereafter compare Jevons' series with various other series.
1 All the articles in Jevons' list are foods and raw materials, but they include a fair proportion of the important articles of this nature for the period concerned. Table 2 contains ' INDEX NUMBERS OF PRICES FOR FORTY COMMODITIES, FOR CORN, FOR METALS,   AND FOR ORIENTAL PRODUCE, 1782-1830   (DATA GIVEN IN TABLE 2) (a) FORTY COMMODITIES. UNITS OP ONE PER CENT.
(C) METALS. UNITS OF ONE PER CENT.
the index numbers derived for all articles, and for those of three important special groups, namely, " corn," metals, and oriental produce. These data are plotted in Chart 1.
Before interpreting the Jevons indices, it will be well to consider another series which appeal's hitherto to have escaped the attention of economists and statisticians. In 1848 Mr. John Taylor, a London publisher interested in monetary questions, presented before the Commons' Secret Committee on Commercial Distress a table containing the average index numbers for ninety commodities for seven-year periods, from 1784-90 (the base period) down to 1833-37 (the last being only a fiveyear period). These were presented both for each commodity separately, and averaged for the entire list. with the exception of beans, peas, mutton, Georgia cotton, fodder, and wrought iron; and in addition it contains those listed in Table 3 . Taylor stated that the figures were taken from a work entitled Tables of Taxation, Currency, and Prices (1837) , of which the author, though unnamed, was quite possibly himself. The prices used were exclusive of duty. The sources and exact method of deriving the individual (average) price ratios are not stated. The final index numbers are a simple arithmetic average of the several items for each period. In Table 4 the re- suits for all commodities for the eight periods are given, and in Chart 2 they are plotted and placed in comparison with Jevons' figures, averaged similarly, and reduced to the same base (an operation sufficiently accurate for the present purpose).
The two price series are in substantial agreement except that (1) the Taylor figures run consistently higher; and (2) the Jevons index reaches a maximum in the period from 1805-11, dropping from 166 to 153 in the following period, while the Taylor index rises from 174 in the period from 1805-11 to a maximum of 177 in the period 1812-18. These differences between the two series are due almost altogether to differences in the two basic commodity lists. The course of commodity prices during the Napoleonic period and until 1830 is reasonably clear. From 1793 to 1814 was a period of increasing prices, in spite of the apparent drop from 1810-14 in Jevons' index. By 1801 prices had risen about 50 per cent above the pre-war level. 3 The upward movement appears then to have halted for two or three years. Early in 1802 the first phase of the war with France was closed by the Peace of Amiens. Hostilities were resumed, however, in 1803, and continued with varying scope and intensity computed. The high point of prices, as shown by these data, was reached in 1813-14 and not in 1810 as the Jevons series indicates. These data strengthen the conclusion that the Taylor series rather than the Jevons series correctly describes the general price movement. -Editor.
3 Of course, these war prices were paper money prices, for the Bank of England had suspended specie payments February 26, 1797. until 1815. The price level, temporarily declining from 1801 to 1804, rose rapidly again from 1805 to 1810. From 1810 to 1814 there was probably no material change, the general level remaining about 70 per cent above the average of the decade before the war.
1 The return to the old level was rapid, occupying only seven or eight years, and beginning shortly before the declaration of peace. The fall of prices in 1815 and 1816 was pronounced. The following two years witnessed a tendency toward somewhat higher prices. Resumption of specie payments was begun by the Bank of England in 1819, and fully accomplished in 1821. By the latter year prices were generally at about the pre-war level. The higher prices of 1825-26 are rather the outward phases of deficient harvests and speculative enterprise than of the price cycle of the war. In accounting for the quick drop of prices in England after 1814 it should be remembered that conditions were unlike the present in at least three important particulars:
1. A return to pre-war prices was a question of bringing an inconvertible paper circulation to a sound specie basis. Questions of convertibility do not complicate the present situation. The existing monetary inflation persists in the face of unrestricted gold payments. 2. In the years following the Napoleonic wars the general tendency of agricultural prices was downward. No such tendency is to be expected at this time. 3. The production of the precious metals was low during the first decades of the nineteenth century. 2 No sustained diminution of gold output is observable at present.
MONEY WAGES
Statistics of wages for this period are difficult to obtain; but for the sake of completeness I offer for comparison with the average price data of Taylor and Jevons the interesting index numbers of wages calculated by Mr. G. H. Woods, published in the Economic Journal for December 1899.
3 These numbers represent money wages in twenty-four industrial centers in the United Kingdom (no agricultural wages being included) at four-or five-year intervals. For some of the earlier years not all the centers are represented. The base year is 1840. The years fall sufficiently well within the 1 The following seventeen articles included in Taylor's figures, but not in Jevons 7 , rose higher in the period 1812-18 than in 1805-11: alum, cognac, Sunderland coal, currants, figs, flour, malt, Malaga raisins, caraway seeds, rape seeds, linseed, quicksilver, Jamaica rum, refined sugar, port wine, sherry wine, Bohea tea.
2 Soetbeer's statistics of the average annual gold production of the world for the period are as follows: These results are plotted for comparison with the two price curves on Chart 2. Wages show a striking similarity to Taylor's price curve through their fifth period, when they both reached maximum values, 160 and 177 per cent respectively. It is quite probable that if the indices had been computed and averaged for shorter periods, e. g., annually, wages would have lagged in topping their crest and starting down, as they lagged in rising, but by not as long as the seven years between periods measured from center to center. Another noteworthy feature is the sluggish downward slope of the wage curve in the last two periods, the era of reconstruction. In studying this wage curve, it should be remembered that both price bases are the 1784-90 average, while the wage base is the level in 1790, when a rise had probably already begun. This has the effect of giving line (C) a later " take-off " from 100 than it would in fact have shown if data had made closer comparability of base practicable. To compensate for that fact, we should have to move the points on the dotted line upward by a percentage equal to the percentage excess of the 1790 wage level over the unknown average 1784-90 wage level. Thus the greater sensitiveness of wages in their rise than in their fall, already seemingly pointed out by the curves as they stand, would be still more strikingly demonstrated.
PRICE OF GOLD AND SILVER AND COURSE OF THE EXCHANGES
In addition to the prices of commodities, it is desirable to study the prices of gold and silver and the course of the exchanges during the existence of the Bank restriction. Weekly quotations for standard gold bars, foreign gold coin, standard silver bullion, and Spanish silver dollars, as well as the course of exchange on Hamburg, Paris, and Lisbon, are given in in sufficient magnitude to be of significance, and so many of the quotations are lacking that it was found desirable to use the price of silver instead of gold for securing annual averages. Monthly averages for both silver dollars and gold coin were, however, first obtained and plotted. These indicated, where comparison was possible, a nearly perfect correspondence, and hence justified the use of silver alone for the purpose in hand. The weekly data for Spanish dollars were accordingly averaged for each year. The theoretical gold price of dollars was then calculated according to Soetbeer's figures of the ratio between gold and silver at Hamburg. 1 Then, for each year, the percentage deviations of the average price in paper from this approximate calculated true par were obtained, from 1790 until 1824 inclusive. The results are given in Table 6 . The most satisfactory and also the most significant exchange quotations are those for Hamburg, at that time the great entrepot for continental trade.
2 The data for the Paris Exchange are incomplete and somewhat difficult of interpretation, while the usefulness of the Lisbon rates is lessened by the existence in Portugal of a depreciated paper currency. The weekly Hamburg quotations are averaged and expressed in the number of Hamburg schillings, Flemish banco money, given for a pound sterling. The usance of the bills was two and one-half months. Since the Hamburg banco money was payable in silver, it is necessary, in calculating the true par, to employ once more the ratio of gold to silver. ratio of gold to silver into 913.277, on the assumption that the Hamburg ratio would, ordinarily, indicate the ratio in London.
2 Mr. Silberling left for London in July. As we go to press we have received a letter from him stating that he has secured additional series of still more significant exchange rates bearing upon the depreciation of British currency. This par having been calculated, 1 the percentage deviations from it were taken for each year. The data, as they appear in Table 7 , are believed to be as accurate and complete as it is possible to make them; but for a perfect measure of the depreciation of the currency from its standard by means of the exchange it would be necessary to have further data relative to the balance of payments, to the specie points, and to the discount rates at London and Hamburg. All that can be stated regarding the specie points is that the cost of transporting specie to the continent rose from about 3 per cent in 1797 to about 5 §-7 per cent in 1810, but fluctuated consider-1 According to an appendix in the Lords' Report of 1819 (furnished by Dr. Kelly, the cambist) 2 § Hamburg schillings Flemish banco equaled one Flemish marc banco, of which it took 27! to purchase one marc (Cologne weight) of fine silver equal to 3608 grains fine. A schilling Flemish banco would, then, be worth 48.7567 + grains of fine silver. A pound sterling is 113.0016 + grains of fine gold. If the market ratio be multiplied, therefore, by = 2.3177, the result will be the number of schillings given in Hamburg for the bullion equivalent of a pound sterling.
2 Bullion Report y Parliamentary Papers, 1810, 3, p. 11. ably from week to week.
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In 1811, the embargoes against British trade and the confiscation of British manufactures in Europe reached a high degree of effectiveness, and the consequent probable rise of freight and insurance may have produced the peculiar results indicated for that year on Chart 3, where the deviations of the price of silver and the course of exchange from their respective calculated pars are presented. The general inverse movement is virtually perfect except during 1810-12, but deviations of silver are in general greater than for exchange rates. The maximum price of silver was reached in 1813, two years after the maximum price level according to Jevons. Comparing the silver curve of Chart 3 with the two price curves of Chart 2, it is instructive to observe that: (1) the range of deviations from 100 per cent is much narrower for silver than for either Taylor's or Jevons' general commodities; (2) the silver curve increased later and dropped earlier than any of the curves on Chart 2, in other words showing a naturally much greater stability about its par than commodities at large. A detailed study of the changes in both silver and gold exchange would disclose at many points a close connection between their fluctuations and the state of military and naval operations.
INTEREST AND DISCOUNT RATES
We now turn to a consideration of interest and discount rates. It has long been customary to measure the changes in the rate of interest in England by the calculated yield upon 3 per cent Consolidated Annuities. In order to obtain more reliable figures than are afforded by the usual average of the yearly high and low quotations for consols, an annual average has been taken of the mean of the monthly high and low prices given by the Gentlemen's Magazine.
2 The average yield is derived in the usual manner by dividing 3 per cent by the average price, and the results are given in Table 8 . I shall defer comment upon the data until I have explained several other series of interest rates assembled on Chart 4.
To ascertain the rate of interest at this time upon funds invested in private undertakings involves unusual difficulties. The published quotations of security prices 1 A study of the exchanges from week to week in connection with political affairs would be desirable, though not possible within the scope of the present article, in which annual data alone have been used.
2 Of the trustworthiness of this source William Newmarch testifies as follows, in an article dealing with Pitt's war finance: "Those returns (of prices in the magazine) were furnished by the brokers whose names they bear, and give the highest and lowest price of each kind of stock on each week-day of each month; and of their accuracy, and sufficiency for the present purpose, there can be no question. are meagre and must be pieced together from diverse sources (mainly monthly periodicals). In the second place, funds were much more frequently invested in consols and the stocks and shares of docks, insurance companies, and other undertakings, than loaned at a fixed rate of interest upon bonds. I have been able to discover one enterprise, however, which meets our requirements to a fair degree for the years 1806-28. In the year 1806 there were completed in London the West India Docks, running through from Blackwall to Limehouse on the Thames. The dock company was formed in 1799; it opened an import dock with warehouses in 1802, and an export dock, which completed the undertaking, in 1806. The capital of the company, originally £500,000, was increased to £1,200,000 at the completion of the construction, and was entirely paid up at that time. By the terms of the charter the docks were to enjoy a monopoly of all the shipping with the West Indies until 1824, and until then the dividends upon the capital stock were not to exceed 10 per cent per annum from the time that the entire plant was put into operation. The enterprise was ably planned and managed, and proved extremely successful. But what is important for the present investigation, the gross dividends declared remained constant at 10 per cent from 1807 until July 1829, when, according to the Gentlemen's Magazine, they dropped to 8 per cent. During this time, therefore, the price of this stock can furnish information as to the rate of interest, which is probably as accurate and reliable as that which would be given by a first-class seasoned "public utility" bond at the present time. The quotations of the company's stock are to be found in several contemporary periodicals: prior to September 1813, they are taken from the London Monthly Magazine; thereafter from the Gentlemen's Magazine, with occasional use of the New Monthly Magazine and the European Magazine for purposes of comparison and checking. The quotations were furnished to these magazines by various stock brokers, and give the ruling market price (sometimes the high and low, which are never far apart) for about the first three weeks of each month. Dividends were paid in January and July, and the stock was frequently, but not uniformly, quoted ex dividend during these and some succeeding months; but in converting the monthly prices into annual averages no correction for this fact was thought possible or necessary. It is important to add that during the war the company usually paid dividends with the property tax deducted; the net dividends actually paid are to be found in the appendix to a Parliamentary Report of 1823 in which the company's history and affairs are examined in great detail, and these have been used in the calculation of the actual yields.
1 These have been obtained by dividing the dividend by the average yearly price of the stock. The results appear in Table 9 . The capital was £1,200,000. t Par = £100.
As a still further expedient for measuring interest rates, and particularly those upon securities of intermediate maturity, resort may be had to the interest paid by the government on Exchequer bills. These were securities issued annually for current expenses and usually against the revenues of the succeeding years, and at the option of the holder might be redeemed at the end of one year at par, or converted into the subsequent issue. The rate of interest allowed on them was varied from time to time to correspond as nearly as possible to the rate prevailing in the market, but might not exceed 5 1/2 per cent nor fall below 2 per cent. A considerable proportion of the unfunded debt consisted of such Exchequer bills. In the Parliamentary Accounts and Papers for 1857-58, vol. 33, is given a statement of the capital value and interest charge on Exchequer bills for each year (ending January 5), from 1696 to 1857. Dividing the latter by the former we obtain approximate figures of the rate of interest actually paid to the holders from 1790 to 1830. These rates being fixed at stated intervals (once a year) naturally do not respond to influences bearing upon the money market during those periods, but nevertheless they will be found a valuable supplement to our other data (see Table 10 ).
During the Napoleonic war and continuing down to the year 1834, the rates of interest and discount in England were subject to the limitations imposed throughout the period of this study by the Usury Laws, which proclaimed a maximum rate of 5 per cent. The existence of these laws did not, of course, prevent higher rates of interest than 5 per cent from being obtained through security transactions; 3 nor did it prevent the government from occasionally paying a higher rate. The Laws did have the effect, however, of discouraging the published statement of the rates of discount (plus commissions) charged by all banks save the Bank of England. 4 The Bank maintained a constant rate of 5 per cent for the discount of private paper (usually sixty-five day bills) until June 20, 1822, when the rate on the best securities was lowered to 4 per cent. On December 13, 1825, the rate again became 5 per cent and remained so until July 5, 1827, when the 4 per cent rate was resumed and continued through 1830.
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Let us now examine these statistics of interest rates as they appear together on Chart 4. The course of the three curves indicates unmistakably the limits of the period of war strain. By 1819-22 the rate on bills is precisely what it was during 1789-94. In 1821-22 the yield on consols is clearly back at the pre-war level. Thus the effects of the war on the market seem to have been overcome by the opening of the decade of the twenties. Until the end of the war it is seen that the fluctuations of the yield on consols and the interest on Exchequer bills follow the same general course, the former being usually somewhat higher. After 1815, the rate paid on bills falls considerably below the yield of consols. The yield on the West India Dock stock, so far as these figures go, bears a remarkably close relation to the yield on consols, being approximately 1 per cent above it, except in the year 1816. This demonstrates clearly that ordinarily the yield upon consols may be taken. as a fairly close indication of variations in the general condition of the market for capital. The divergence of the two curves in 1816 is, however, of considerable importance, the fall of the consols rate being due to the political circumstances attending successful termination f After 1826 the discounts given in the account do not include those at the branch banks which were started in 1827.
of the long war in the preceding year; while the rise in the yield from the West India dividends bears accurate witness to the severe crisis which occurred in 1816 -concerning which there is abundant corroborative testimony in other quarters.
1 It is quite possible that the fall of the rate on consols in 1802 should be interpreted in the same manner, for a similar reason. 
CURRENCY
In passing to statistics of currency, we may begin with the note circulation of the Bank of England. In Appendix 82 to the Report of the Committee on the Bank Charter of 1832, there are data of the average outstanding bank notes for each quarter year from 1792 to 1831. From these quarterly averages annual averages were derived. In Appendices 56 and 58 of the same Report, the quarterly average and also annual average holdings of private commercial paper discounted by the Bank are given; and these annual figures have been placed together with the outstanding circulation in Table 11 . Appendices 24 and 32 of the Report give the average public and private deposits in the Bank beginning with 1807, 1 from which it appears that the private deposits were very moderate and steady, varying between one and two millions at the outside. The great bulk of the private discounts therefore involved note issues. If, then, the difference between the average discounts and the average total circulation be taken, the result will indicate with fair accuracy the notes issued by the Bank for the purchase from the public or the government of Exchequer and Treasury bills (the only forms of public security in which the Bank then invested) and for the purchase of bullion and coin. The results are plotted on Chart 5. Unfortunately, we do not possess official annual data for either of these last mentioned accounts. The nearest approximation to them are figures for but two days in each year, one at the end of February, the other at the end of August-to be found in Appendix 5 of the Report for 1832. It would be unsafe to attempt to employ such meagre data for comparison with, and further elaboration of, the above statistics; but since during the restriction the specie holdings of the Bank probably did not fluctuate with very great suddenness, the February-August data for the reserve may be presented for purposes of a rough comparison (Table 12) . These figures permit the statement, in a general way, that the Bank made considerable purchases of bullion from 1798 to 1800, 1805 to 1808, and subsequent to 1816, when preparations began for the resumption of cash payments.
Making due allowance for the issue of notes for specie, it appears from the different curves on Chart 5 that the advance in notes made by the Bank directly or indirectly to the government were extremely small during the war, and during 1805-10 almost negligible. The magnitude of the credits granted to the government in other forms can be very roughly seen only for the period after 1807 in the data of the annual average public deposits. (See Table 13 .) These vary but little from year to year, and decline sharply after 1816. The coincide with the peaks of the price curve.
1 After 1816 the rate of interest paid by the government on Exchequer bills declined so greatly that the Bank was forced to carry a much larger amount; and the investment by October 10, 1815 to January 5, 1816 Year ended January 5,1817 the Bank in public securities was made all the more necessary by the fact that the market rate of discount on commercial paper fell much further below the Bank rate than it had been in the earlier years.
1 From 1821 on the amount of accommodation granted by the Bank to the mercantile community was no greater than at the opening of the war period.
Statistics of the metallic circulation of England for this period do not exist. We know simply that soon after the commencement of the Bank restriction, in 1797, specie began to disappear from circulation, and its place was taken by paper. The loss of the gold coin was earliest and most seriously felt (the silver being in a much more worn and degraded condition), and the Bank consequently was permitted to issue, during the con- Leatham calculated (for other than the above years) that the average amount of bills outstanding at a given time was one-fourth of the total number created, 2 and the figures inserted in column 2 are obtained in this manner.
In any statement of the displacement of coin by paper during the restriction, it is most important to make allowance for the practically unknown quantity of this bill circulation. 1815, at which times the circulation outstanding could not be reissued, but was replaced by new notes bearing the higher stamps.
1 If a calculation were made of the notes stamped, the results would be affected by the larger demand for stamps directly after a change in the scale of duties. This circumstance, however, is probably of no great consequence for the notes of the smaller denominations -particularly those of one poundsince these circulated so rapidly and became so worn in the space of a year that a considerable proportion of them would in any case be replaced by new notes within a year's time. If then a calculation is made for the smaller notes, the results will be of value in indicating at least the scale of fluctuations in the notes circulated by the provincial bankers outside the London area. Such a calculation has been made of the notes falling in two of the several classifications, namely, (1) notes not exceeding £1, is., which are assumed to be mainly one pound notes, and (2) notes falling between £2, 2s. and £5, $s. 9 which are taken as five-pound notes, on the 1 It is not wholly clear whether the notes were actually called in or simply not again reissued; but in the former case the process would not have been sufficiently immediate to affect the assumptions made in the course of the analysis.
